“Common Action”Initiative Group
Public Hearings in connection with Khodorkovsky - Lebedev and Pichugin cases
“yukos” case and socio-political situation in russia”
On June 29, 2004, from 11-00 a.m. to 3-00 p.m., the first meeting of “Public Hearings in connection with Khodorkovsky-Lebedev and Pichugin Cases” was held in the Internet hall of the Central House of Journalists.
Subject of the meeting: The Yukos case and the socio-political situation in Russia
The meeting was conducted by the Public Committee composed of:
L.M. Alexeeva, President of the International Helsinki Federation, Chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group
S.A. Kovalev, Chairman of the “Memorial” Russian Society, President of the Institute for Human Rights
Executive secretary of the Hearings – L.A. Ponomarev, Executive Director of the Movement “For Human Rights”
Experts: Alexander Alexandrovich Auzan, Mikhail Lvovich Berger, Lev Dmitrievich Gudkov, Iosif Mikhailovich Dzialoshinsky, Alexei Petrovich Kandaurov, Evgeny Alexeevich Kiselev, Alexander Alexandrovich Konovalov, Boris Borisovich Nadezhdin, Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov, Dmitry Borisovich Oreshkin, Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky, Alexander Petrovich Tkachenko.
The public hearings were arranged by the assembly of representatives of the human rights advocates community – “Common Action” Initiative Group.
Electronic version of the verbatim report:
http://odgroup.narod.ru/stenogramma_29_06.htm
http://zaprava.ru/dbs/text.php?id=30
Lev Alexandrovich Ponomarev: The public hearings on Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Pichugin cases are held by decision of the “Common Action” Initiative Group. This Group comprises a considerable number of human rights organisations in Russia, in particular, Moscow Helsinki Group, “Memorial”, movements for human rights, Committee for Civil Rights, etc. (more than a dozen of major Russian human rights organisations). At its meeting, the “Common Action” Group passed the resolution that Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Pichugin, Trepashkin, Sutyagin are political prisoners. While discussing the situation around Yukos, we decided to launch public hearings in order to spotlight some particular aspects of these proceedings and address publicly and openly the problems that have arisen in relation to the Yukos case. It is planned that there will be a few hearings and the first event will be dedicated to the impact produced by the Yukos case upon social and political processes in the country. The hearings will be held as follows. We have a committee that includes Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeeva and Yuri Alexeyevich Ryzhov, who got stuck somewhere at his dacha. I talked to him yesterday, and he said, “I will try to come”. He was solving some problems there, far in the country, and yet he promised to take part in our hearings. I still hope that he will arrive. The committee will hear opinions of experts and ask them questions. The experts, well-known politicians, political analysts, public figures have been invited, the list of whom was presented to you. Now, I am giving floor to members of the committee. Lyudmila Mikhailovna, you are welcome.
L.M. Alexeeva: Well, I think, before asking questions, we members of the committee will be allowed to describe very briefly our own view of this case and explain why we have chosen this very case from the incredibly numerous number of court proceedings currently underway in this country.
I have had a few opportunities to convey to journalists, public figures and politicians our standpoint concerning Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Pichugin cases and now I will provide a brief summary of our views of the matter to our experts. In my opinion, Khodorkovsky’s principal guilt (all the others seem to be additional to it) consisted in that he was the first representative of big business who, firstly, dared to make his business transparent, which is extremely important not only from the economic viewpoint, but also from the political and civil ones, since no society with fly-by-night business can be democratic, stable or prosperous. He was the first who dared to “expose” his business, though it implied, naturally, huge taxes. He did it not only because (at least as I see it) he got tired of living “in shadow”, but also because he understood the significance of such business transparency for the society and hoped that others would follow him. And I think he would have had such followers if the authorities had not taken such a stand towards his initiative arresting this man. Secondly, through making his business transparent, he sort of tried to conclude an alliance with the society and established the “Open Russia” public organisation. By the way, the very name, “Open Russia”, is symbolic. Khodorkovsky made an attempt to enter into an alliance with the society. He was the first to respond to the society’s social needs and major problems, to provide financial support to projects important to civil society and its development. As far as I can see, the idea was that an alliance of the civil society and business in our country would strengthen them both and make their joint power equal to that of the domestic bureaucracy, which would enable business to liberate itself from being dependent on the bureaucracy, the need to smear bureaucrats, pay to “right” persons. Instead, business would finance projects significant to society. In my opinion, our bureaucrats grasped that they might lose their command of both society and business, which led to the arrest of Khodorkovsky. Quite clear, my view of the process allows the conclusion that Khodorkovsky and those who had been chosen to be his “sidekicks” are political prisoners. This is, in brief, what I wanted to tell you.
S.A. Kovalev: Dear ladies and gentlemen, I believe that everything has been said on the purpose of these hearings. The interest of the public in these hearings is high enough, as well as the interest in the case, and it is quite natural. I would like to make only one remark, rather significant in my opinion. By no means the organisers of these hearings are going to arrange any proceeding parallel to that in court. With all the apprehension we may have as to administration of justice in this case, we nonetheless by no means intend any interference in the process. Our only requirement to the proceedings, the requirement quite natural and lawful, is as follows: the proceedings must be open, transparent and well covered in mass media. With these conditions provided, a fair decision will be made, naturally, unless the evident political component of the affair prevails over law provisions. Therefore, we will not touch upon the subject of to what extent the accusations are reasoned. It is within the competence of the court solely. We must watch carefully, attentively and very purposefully in what way the case is being heard at the court. Our today’s subject is the socio-political significance of the case that has already acquired a wide public resonance (in the opinion of many people, it had been meant for such a resonance). The trial seems to be made a show one. I think we must listen to our experts attentively, ask them all relevant questions, and conclusions will be inferred later.
L.A. Ponomarev: Now we are giving floor to Lev Dmitrievich Gudkov who is going to present his views in front of the commission.
L.D. Gudkov: I was invited as an expert since our centre (Yuri Levada analytical center, former ‘VTsU’), through regular sociological surveys, watches the public attitude towards the most significant events, including the Yukos case. According to the Russian Federation population, this case was in the “Top 10” events of the previous year and no less important than Duma elections, Iraq war, etc. Thus, it was considered one of the most significant events of the year. The first reaction to the arrest of Khodorkovsky and the Yukos case was that it was a purely political event. The respondents believed that the reasons for the arrest and initiation of the prosecution were of political nature, and had nothing to do with breach of law. This opinion was shared by 65% of the respondents and only 16% considered at the beginning of the prosecution that it had resulted from some law violations. Such was the attitude to the case. The dynamics of the public opinion slightly varied, and later I will dwell upon the matter. Around 57 % of the respondents thought that the authorities, the President’s administration were going to perform an exhibitory crackdown of the company or an exhibitory trail to scare large business and, to some extent, intimidate, scare, make more controllable the groups that were planning to use their weight, including economic power, for influencing political decisions. In the public opinion, it was the primary objective, that is, to organise a show trial to subdue the developing centre of influence, public influence, and bring it under control of the authorities, the administration. The views as to why it was Yukos that had been chosen for the persecution split: 31% thought that the company had a slightly “darker” history, more discreditable practices in the past, more breaches of law, whereas 35% believed that the company in general and Khodorkovsky in particular had grown too independent, started playing too significant political role and for that reason the authorities made a decision to crush them down. The rest of the respondents had not arrived at any definite opinion by that time. It was the very start of the process. In this context, actions on the part of the prosecution were not interpreted as independent, and the majority were sure that the prosecution was following Putin’s instructions (either openly or secretly expressed) and adhering to Putin’s policy. In this context, these events were similar to previous processes, viz., Gusinsky case, NTV crackdown, that is, suppression of independent centres of influence. To my mind, the lack of lawfulness or legal justification in the case in question indicates a partial restoration of political rhetoric of previous times, enemy hunting, struggle against oligarchs, introducing law and order. These are very important aspects that create a specific political, moral, even psychological climate in the country. Uncontrolled consolidation of the power that pursues its own objectives - in that way it was interpreted by the society. Opinions regarding the matter split. Older, less educated, somewhat pro-Soviet categories of the population applauded, whereas more educated, younger people were perplexed, worried and even indignant. Another very important aspect was that a widely accepted opinion was that the prosecution and law enforcement bodies that initiated the case were trying to improve their public image through struggle against oligarchs. In the public opinion, owing to rhetoric, propaganda and absence of any voices in opposition, oligarchs, whatever vague or indefinite meaning this word may have, are perceived very much as “enemies of the people” since it is based on the view of businessmen as persons who strip the country of its riches and instead of using national riches of Russia for the benefit of the people, they use them in their own interests and export them to the West, which is, naturally, extremely painful for an average citizen. Again, owing to political rhetoric, a considerable part of the public considered oligarchs one of the most important causes or factors leading to mass impoverishment of the population. They were perceived as persons or forces responsible for the people living in misery, without any hopes for a better future. In this context, the authorities that introduce law and order, are trying to redistribute powers, riches and influence, such authorities are allegedly on the side of the most miserable. The rhetoric is something like this. Yet, while comprehending and approving these efforts, the population showed a certain scepticism as well, considering them as a sort of a propaganda campaign, similar to the struggle against “turnskins”, corruption, etc. The opinion was widely shared that it had to do with traditional, habitual actions of the authorities, aimed at improving their image. By and large, the impact upon the society was relatively weak. Certainly, it revived all those reflexes of Soviet-inherent conscience, worn-in obedience to the power, the habit of being aware that the authorities’ actions are unrestricted, based on its own weight. However, the people liked it and nearly half the respondents believed that these actions would produce no harmful effect if one oligarch was imprisoned. Let us say, the authorities would not be able to control all the others, nonetheless, generally, such actions were perceived with certain satisfaction, as a familiar policy on the part of the authorities.
As to the court, since actions of the prosecution or the authorities reveal clearly selfish aims, partially fight of different clans and partially actions of competitors, and despite the fact that the public perceived the persecution with certain satisfaction, a bit more pronounced than disapproval, yet the future trial is regarded as unfair. Fifty percent of the respondents believe that the judgement will not be fair, objective or honest. The opposite viewpoint is shared by only 28%, who suppose that the trial will result not only in a policy of exhibitory intimidation of large business, but also in some redistribution of property. Thank you for your attention. I would rather stop at this point.
L. A. Ponomarev: Thank you. Now questions. Lyudmila Mikhailovna or Sergei Adamovich, which of you? Have you any questions? Yes, you are welcome, Lyudmila Mikhailovna.
L. M. Alexeeva: It concerns the things that I said about Khodorkovsky’s efforts to make a sort of friends with the society. Were such questions, at least in indirect form, raised or they were absent from your questionnaires?
L. D. Gudkov: Yes, we asked such questions. I should say that common people in general are poorly informed about this aspect of Yukos and Khodorkovsky’s activities. I say that under conditions of the controlled information field in the last years, this aspect was just the least highlighted to common people and only very few more educated people, usually informed public in capital cities, scientists, academicians, pressmen, knew about it. This part of information hasn’t practically reached the layer of the society we consider common people, so people simply didn’t know about it.
S. A. Kovalev: You have mentioned some dynamics of, so to say, opinions concerning this process. May I ask you to give a more detailed information about it? Is my understanding correct that the so-called accusatory spirit has gradually become dominant in society and one of the reasons for it is the effect of related propaganda efforts?
L. D. Gudkov: You are right. There is certain dynamics. Well, for example, when the arrest took place, we asked the question, why it was Khodorkovsky and Yukos that were subjected to persecution, whether it was related to the fact that the company had committed more law violations or tax evasion offences, or, perhaps, the company irritated the authorities by its independent behaviour. At first, in October-November of the last year, about 31% of the respondents thought that the reason was the amount of violations committed by the company. And in May, more specifically, in late May this year, a month ago, already 40% shared this opinion. The shift was due not to those people who attached political importance thereto, but to the least informed, least educated people. It demonstrates that it is under conditions of informational isolation that propaganda affects the least educated layers of society who absorb this rhetoric of both public prosecution and authorities and take it in general with satisfaction. But the share of those who think that this case is political and connected with the political status of Yukos, with the company’s approach to doing business, almost hasn’t changed. The percentage of people who considered that the Yukos case was caused by political reasons was 35%, and in May of the current year the figure was 34%. It means that there are almost no changes here. It may be supposed that the sooner the trial is, the more aggressive the governmental propaganda and the accusatory spirit will be. And it will be, more or less, accepted by the public. But I don’t think that this opinion will be shared by the majority. Still, there is strong suspicion and skepticism towards.... I haven’t mentioned one very important thing. There is a very clear understanding of the selective nature of law enforcement in the public opinion, understanding of the fact that it has nothing to do with universal enforcement of law or maintaining public order, but a specific company has been chosen and subjected to persecution. It is clearly realized, and that’s why the legitimacy, the lawfulness of the prosecution’s actions is called in question. And these doubts will survive, notwithstanding all propaganda efforts.
L. A. Ponomarev: Now we are giving floor to Alexander Alexandrovich Auzan, Doctor of Economics. He is also the leader of the international public association for protection... Well, I think, he will introduce himself.
А. А. Аuzan: In this case, of course, I am speaking as Doctor of Economics, professor, chair of a department at the Moscow State University and president of the “Public Contract” Institute rather than the president of the Confederation of Consumer Societies. As an economist, I specialise in the domain of institutional economics, i.e. field of science that studies the development of formal and informal rules in economic life, so, if you please, I would try to answer some questions brought by the committee to the attention of the experts from the said point of view.
Firstly, in my opinion, the economic essence of the Yukos case stems from the choice of the strategy that was made after the default, that is, after the 1998 crisis. The point is that after the crisis big business could choose one of several options for further development, and Yukos clearly accepted a new strategy aimed at the company’s capitalisation growth. They could continue increasing the number of the controlled objects, or speeding up the production, or raising profit rates, but Yukos maximised the market estimated value of the company, and in what way could they do it? Through increasing the transparency, acceptance of new rules, clarification of corporate governance procedures. I stress that in my opinion Yukos did all these things for commercial reasons rather than political ones, and this strategy has proved to be quite effective. If we take into account that the capitalisation of the company has grown by an order of magnitude within 4 years, and it has been estimated at 30 billion dollars in the summer of 2003, even before the merger with Sibneft, it is evident that the situation changed the whole context of the social and economic field. Why? I will answer this question: to whom did this strategy promise no advantage? I would mention two groups of interests, to which, evidently, a third one can now be added.
The first group of interests is, of course, bureaucratic groups that used to make profit on small, middle and large business because of its clearly semi-licit and illegal activity. The situation offered opportunities for creation of both corruption schemes and direct blackmailing. The course towards capitalisation chosen by Yukos was connected with reaching another legality level and allowed, as the company management thought, abandonment of those grey and black payments to the above bureaucratic structures.
The second group of interests, for whom such a scenario wasn’t of advantage, is Yukos’ rivals that continued pursuing another strategy and did not intend to take higher costs and risks connected with property disclosure, change of management mechanisms in their groups. And I think public-opinion polls have demonstrated that these risks are real, because after the disclosure of the property and number of billionaires in the group Yukos rather lost than won in essential sectors of public opinion, since they announced themselves as really rich people and specified the persons who owned such fortunes. In my view, besides these two groups, a third group interested in escalating the Yukos case has appeared. It manifested itself when people began to talk about the collapse of this prosperous company. I mean “predatory” groups which also have interests of their own. When a bankruptcy of such a scale occurs, its consequences give chance to many people to make a fortune. And the motive that one breaks a piano to make a mirror out of the cover piece is now starting to come into reality when there is a high probability of the collapse of the company estimated at 30 billion dollars. And now the last thing I would like to tell the Commission and the audience. There is an item in the questionnaire connected with the year of 2000, with the previous anti-oligarch campaign. Is there any connection here? It seems to me that there is some connection. And I would speak about the model of armistice that was created in 2000 and was defined as a “model of equidistance” declared by the President rather than about the problem of taking actions against the “MOST” group or Berezovsky’s empire. I claim that such a convention, and it looked like a convention, was announced by the President to the business community and resulted in a kind of mutual consent upon the thesis “authorities do not interfere in business, business does not interfere in politics”, but I claim that this convention couldn’t have been adhered to by the parties. Firstly, because its character was declarative rather than elaborated, secondly, it didn’t take a number of practical issues into account. For example, I should mention two issues. The convention didn’t prohibit financing political parties. We know that large business groups were allowed to support certain political parties, but the issue of whether different shareholders within one group were allowed to provide financial support to different political parties was not addressed in the convention. It is an open question. Globalisation is a much more serious economic issue, but such a tendency was not considered in 2000 at all. Yet, it is a serious issue. For example, is it allowed after the merger of Yukos and Sibneft to sell a large block of shares to, say, Exxon or Royal Dutch Shell, a major multinational company? Does it pose any threat to national interests of Russia? Will it cause redistribution in the world oil market? Or, perhaps, it is allowed to sell shares to an English company, as it was done by TNK and British Petroleum, but it may not be sold to an American one? The convention does not touch upon any of these questions, because it is abracadabra rather than an arrangement. So I think the armistice entered into in 2000 was doomed to fail, and the fact that this crisis that affected the most fast-growing group of large business, which has been paving the way to strategies new in many ways, now influences and will influence the future of the country in general and the efficiency of formal and informal rules in the country. Thank you.
L. M. Alexeeva: I would like just to ask you to dwell a bit more upon your last phrase. In what way, in your opinion, does this whole story with Yukos affect the Russian economy on the whole and is it capable of affecting the economy in the future?
А. А. Аuzan: To begin with, I think it is a message to any business that they should hide their capitals rather than disclose them. This strategy turns out to be more reasonable from the economic point of view. Indeed, those large companies that appeared in the 1990s in the same way as Menatep and Yukos have proved to be winners, though they prefer maintaining both system of internal relations and system of external relations absolutely non-transparent, co-operating with governmental structures, more specifically, with bureaucratic groups in well known ways, interlacing interests, black and gray payments and so on. So that is why, undoubtedly, the country received the above message, which means that now the Russian economy will face more difficulties in implementing international integration schemes Russia is formally joining now and will join in the future. Secondly, it seems to me we encourage the development of illegal rules rather than legal ones. Our courts prefer making decisions in accordance with the authorities’ will, instead of deciding whether a person is guilty or not through applying legal provisions, or, to be more exact, whether a person is useful to these authorities or not. When doing so, the courts proceed from their own motives and take no account of the existing law. So I think we will be watching a negative impact in several directions, and in my view, quoted stock figures on turnover, i.e. what is now happening with stock prices, is not the most serious negative consequences of the Yukos case.
S. A. Kovalev: Alexander Alexandrovich, I would like to hear some more details about the interests of authorities, central authorities, I don’t mean bureaucratic or “predatory” groups or competitors, I mean the authorities, the high level of the power. I would put my question in the following manner. You have mentioned that so-called declaration of 2000, “equidistance”, and do you think, generally speaking, that a question about non-involvement of business circles in power can be raised in a civilised country?
А. А. Аuzan: I will begin with the supreme power’s interests, but since I'm an economist rather than a political analyst, I would like to refer to the fact that, generally speaking, this question has been elaborated on in institutional economics, there are the so-called models, a set of McGuire-Walson models, which describe what lucrative interests are pursued by the authorities in their relationship with business, where private interests of the power may lie. In particular, these models have proved that the main interest of the government is combination of the lowest costs connected with business and society taxation and receiving the highest income of the power proper. They are also interested in balancing interests of the supreme power and their agents in the form of different bureaucratic groups which may be in a certain way independent and exist on their own, without governmental support. Yukos was evidently leaving the system of semi-legal relationship in which it was easier to collect the tribute, because it could be collected both legally and illegally, transferring the funds both to official budget accounts and different off-budgetary funds. I would say that in this context it is more expensive for the government to deal with business and the society where everything is established lawfully and so there is a possibility, for example, to litigate some actions connected with collecting money. That’s why, Sergei Adamovich, I will stress once again that this question about the motives of the supreme power is much more complicated and, apparently, requires a consideration from different points of view. Political analysts will have their own opinion, but being an economist I claim that in this context the authorities had chosen the “trajectory of the lowest resistance” when everybody is in some gray area. It is easier to deal with them, takes less money to settle different problems, because everybody is under pressure of the authorities in such conditions.
Now as to the question if it is possible to limit the influence of business upon political life and the problem of the 2000 convention.
There is a real problem here. I would like to remind that at the turn of the 19th century the USA met with a similar problem. At that time large oligarchic groups influenced immensely the political situation and, as you remember, mass movements occurred in the USA. These movements advocated the elimination of such groups from political life, but the problem was solved not by the way of legislation. Some other questions were solved by the way of legislation. Anti-trust laws were enacted. They limited the intervention of such large groups in the economy. And in politics a system of ethical restrictions was created which prevented any billionaire from taking any high level position from the beginning of the 20th century, because people did not approve of such a combination of financial resources and political power. So it is a real problem. And we can’t say the problem of intervention of large business in the economy does not exist. But I think it may be solved in a totally different manner, because we really need lobbying laws, we really need civil control, including control of the parliament activity. Because it is parliament that advocates the interests of such large groups. It was also necessary to solve the problem of legalisation of ownership rights which were acquired in the 1990s under conditions of numerous contradictions and collisions in the legislation. This question could be solved by passing such a legislative package which would help reconcile interests of different social groups and would be connected with both accepting ownership rights and passing laws to protect rights of other groups - social, ecological, labour and so on and so forth. In the summer of 2003 we offered a way to solve the problem. I would like to remind that there was a crisis group which included both civil organisations and large business associations. We offered the approach to the President, the government and parliament. Some preparations were made and then embodied in the document called “The Program of the New Social Contract”. And the President was about to accept this program, but in the morning of October 25 the process was interrupted, because on that day Mikhail Khodorkovsky was flying from the very Nizhegorodsky Forum where negotiations on this legislative package took place, and it was then when he was arrested. Thank you.
L. A. Ponomarev: Now I am giving floor to Iosif Mikhailovich Dzialoshinsky. I hope everybody will introduce himself or herself to the audience, otherwise I will confuse everything up. Now I would like to touch upon several organisational questions. Maybe, some speakers were given more time than envisaged and maybe a certain scheme should be worked out. So I would like to ask how much time do you need?
I. M. Dzialoshinsky: And how much time may I take, 5-7 minutes?
L. A. Ponomarev: Well, let’s agree as follows. You will speak for 5 minutes, then answer questions for about 5 minutes, then we will have enough time... More time, yes? OK, let it be more time. I just thought that it would be more difficult for me to deal wit the experts and some of you would have to wait longer, that’s the problem. So I don’t know what to do. Well, OK, then you will speak for 7 minutes and questions will take 10 minutes more. So we will have enough time for everybody. Iosif Mikhailovich, you are welcome.
I. M. Dzialoshinsky: Thank you. Here I represent the Human Rights Fund, the Commission on Free Access to Information. The Fund was established in 1995, it monitors information awareness of different groups of the Russian society about key points of social development.
I would like to address the issue of the mass media role in the public awareness connected with the Khodorkovsky case. And to consider this problem from three viewpoints. To begin with, the Russian mass media represents a very diversified, segmental system, or, to be more exact, a segmental society of different elements, images and so on and so forth which are very different. We can distinguish three main blocks – it is what we may call “Sadovoye Koltso press”, i.e. what we considered federal, regional and local press earlier.
The second aspect is the following: by and large about 70% of Russian journalists, except those of the “Sadovoye Koltso press”, back up the supreme power in one way or another, because they are more or less sure that the government should be strong and powerful and should have the right to control all processes – economic, social, political, even cultural and religious. This figure is quite reliable and has been confirmed by 5 years of observations. And now the third aspect I would like to speak about. The point is that the Russian mass media reiterate the so-called “quadrangle of hatred”, that is, in the midst of different texts and publications three main enemies of the Russian people, and hence of pressmen, are identified – first and foremost, these are rich people, secondly, bureaucrats, thirdly, people from other regions, newcomers and so on and so forth, and fourthly, the West. So when we apply this “quadrangle of hatred” to the Khodorkovsky case, we can see a funny thing. From one point of view, Khodorkovsky is evidently rich, so it means he is an enemy. From another point of view, he is a stranger, that is, choosing my words carefully, not a native, so he is also an enemy. From the third point of view, he is a person who has absorbed the Western culture, so he is a “triple enemy”. But the main Khodorkovsky’s enemies are bureaucrats. That is why, when Mr. Gudkov was telling us that citizens have some opinions concerning political order and so on, he was absolutely right, but we compared opinions and information awareness. It turned out that about 10% of the Russian population, plus or minus 3%, are informed about the Khodorkovsky case, more precisely, they consider themselves informed, other people know nothing, but have their own views. The favourite sport of our people is to have your own opinion when you know utterly nothing on the issue.
And now I would like to describe the role of the Russian mass media in the Khodorkovsky case. We can identify three main scenarios that were perfectly implemented. The first scenario was a populist one, when the mass media enthusiastically bayed this large beast to the “enemy’s den”. It is clear: the rich steal, a thief must be put into prison. It is the headline of a publication. Yes, famous captain Zheglov had a great triumph here. The second scenario which was implemented by some part of the Moscow mass media was an “objectivistic” one, like, we have nothing to do with it, we are just informing citizens. In the system comprising 84 manipulation technologies I know of this one is the most disgusting, because both selection and publication of facts have been invariantly biased...
And the third scenario realised by the mass media has to do with human rights advocacy. On the whole, it is the press of human rights advocates. About 250-300 small editions, that is, 200 copies, 700 copies, even 2000 copies, made a clear emphasis on the fact that in the Khodorkovsky case human rights were violated. But at the same time not a single scenario touched upon the question that in fact it was necessary to explain the crux of the matter, to specify the problem, to explain that it was impossible then to act in a different manner and so on and so forth... It means that the majority of journalists tried to evade the essence of the problem and took part in a media show, that’s what I call it. Khodorkovsky was shown from one aspect, from another aspect, etc..., i.e. the only important, necessary scenario that must be implemented, that is, the scenario of civil responsibility or explanation of the current situation, was realised practically nowhere. And as a result, we have the following picture: about 70% of Russians do not know anything about the Khodorkovsky case at all, except the fact that it exists. According to our research, about 20% of people have heard something, know something and have guessed something, and about 10% of the population, again +/- 3%, are sure that they have received adequate information. For us, it means at least that again the Russian mass media do not perform their principal function - informing the population on the most important social problems. That’s what I wanted to say off-hand to journalists to make them realise their role.
L.M. Alexeeva: Well, I would like to ask one question from the same set. What do you think – is the Yukos case the continuation of the 2000 anti-oligarchic campaign against Gusinsky, Berezovsky – or is it an entirely different case?
I.M. Dzialoshinsky: I believe that the Gusinsky and Berezovsky cases are part of a purely political campaign which was orchestrated according to a scenario and in which there were involved various segments of the propaganda machine. All went very well then, it is just that when we were following that case as theoreticians we saw how familiar it all was looking back at the 30s, 40s, 50s in Germany, in America. The Khodorkovsky case is fundamentally different, here the scenario is hidden, performers unknown. We have tried to guess who wrote the scenario and who was the producer but so far we have failed. In other words, here a fundamentally different, soft scheme is used, the so-called soft propaganda scheme when diversified sources, when the machine operates in an automatic mode and when journalists voluntarily, with great enthusiasm, voluntarily drive the wolf, you know, into a trap set specially for him. So, here the scheme is different and the mechanism is different.
S.A. Kovalev: I’d like to dwell on your last words. Does it mean that there is a certain center which develops strategy and tactics and this centre has been honing its skills? Or do we observe new and different circumstances?
I.M. Dzialoshinsky: Sergei Adamovich, I believe you yourself know the answer. Certainly there are centres, I would agree with the first half of what you have said, however I find the second. part arguable. As to the skills, I have not yet noticed any special improvement. In 1999, when Gleb Pavlovsky polled experts on what, in our opinion, Putin’s agenda would be during his first years in power I gave answers, and my second point was an arrest of one of the oligarchs and organisation in this connection of a show trial. It was obvious, it was natural, that’s why this scenario suggested itself. As far as some information and propaganda campaigns were concerned, the authors and organisers were obvious. In those times everything was done much more carefully or perhaps it is true that there was no real scenario and the process just evolved in a different way.
L.A. Ponomarev: Now I call upon Dmitry Borisovich Oreshkin. Now, we have consulted with the Commission, we understand that some experts are interested, the more so that the whole thing can take less time, but on the other hand there are some questions we would like to put to the experts, perhaps after they make their statements. That is why we propose the following scenario: we’ll attempt now to follow the example of Iosif Mikhailovich, to proceed in a similar fashion and give all the experts a chance to speak, but those experts who remain will have a chance to answer questions which the Commission will have accumulated. Maybe those present will wish to ask questions. Perhaps such a procedure would be adequate. Please, go ahead, Dmitry Borisovich.
D.B. Oreshkin: Leading researcher of the Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences. Now, I’ll try to offer a formula that in my opinion describes rather than explains the situation. A radical change in the system of values has taken place in the country as a result of which competition and, say, personal ambitions are realised not in the economic sphere but in the administrative -bureaucratic sphere. This means that people who are efficient in economy are offered up as a sacrifice for other basic structural values which they do not understand, among them geopolitical, etatist, administrative-bureaucratic values. This system greatly resembles that of the 1930s when comrade Stalin explained in no uncertain terms that either the kulak would strangle the young proletarian state with his bread prices or the proletarian state would strangle the kulak with its iron hand and destroy him as a class. In other words, the situation is as follows: nowadays the powers that be are not efficient in terms of managing the economy and they are aware of that, while the economically efficient class of people which is in confrontation with the authorities cannot win the competition in another, administrative-power field. This situation actually repeats itself now. It is clear that Yukos was efficient, it is clear that capitalisation was rapidly increasing, moreover, it is clear that it had every opportunity to win the struggle with the administrative apparatus especially if it had succeeded in building a private pipeline network from Siberia for export. In that case not only would Yukos have controlled administrative resources through its governors, not only would it have controlled the oil reserves but also the system of their transportation abroad leaving to the government nothing but taxes, which obviously did not suit the government given the new values system. The government was not interested in the effective development of economy and growing tax base, it must have wanted something else. What exactly – it is becoming clear now. We see that the president in his message said unequivocally that infrastructure including that for oil must belong to the government, we see that liberalisation of Gazprom has been stopped, it happened just this week, we see that structural reform of RAO UES and the energy sector has been stopped. If previously there was talk of solving this problem first in May, then in June, until June 30, now it has been postponed until the end of the year, so it is clear where things are going. We see what is happening to Yukos: in reality the choice has been made, the Rubicon has been crossed and we are moving, if earlier not all the people realised it, now it seems to me that any more or less independent expert understands that those people who determine the strategy of the country’s development have embarked upon the road similar to the Chinese or some other way of development where the leading role belongs not to economic effectiveness or growth of the country’s economic welfare but to other token values which as I have already said could be called geopolitical, bureaucratic, etatist, military. It is easy to forecast growing military expenditures always demanding more money, it is easy to forecast the development of ideologies which would unite people around a single cherished idea proclaimed with great pathos, it is easy to foresee restrictions in mass media, and this technology in my opinion meets with the approval of the majority of population. As a result I do not actually believe that there is a special complex scenario elaborated for mass media with respect to Yukos, it is just that the majority of people happily embrace this ideology and the wind is blowing into the sails of just that category of people who are moving in this direction. Thank you.
S.A. Kovalev: Tell us, please, what is the relationship between that phenomenon observed by you that could generally be described, say, as priority ideological values and the trend, vector of the country’s political development? What is it? Is it an inevitable, necessary and acceptable manoeuvre or something else?
D.B. Oreshkin: The question is clear. I would give you an answer if I knew it. It seems obvious that it is a natural trend moving in the direction of the line of least resistance, that is, for the powers that be it is the easiest road to follow. That it is a trend leading in perspective towards ousting Russia to the periphery in the global game and the loss of that competitiveness which the president has spoken about so often seems to me quite obvious. To my mind it is dangerous, improper and unnecessary but because, firstly, it appeals to the majority and, secondly, to those people who have had enough daring to embody this majority, this trend will continue to develop at an accelerated pace. As a result these etatist expenditures would require more and more money while the economy is going to stall, and sooner or later the government would turn to concrete individuals who too would have to be “milked”. To sum up, prospects are not good but how they are viewed by the people belonging to different cultural strata is a complex question. To me it seems very bad, however many people are delighted, you know it perfectly well.
L.M. Alexeeva: From your reply there emerges such a sad deja-vu. If we take hearings of the Khodorkovsky case I would formulate this question in the following way: do you see here anything in common with those political trials which took place during the consolidation of the Stalin regime or this resemblance is but outward, superficial? Or do you believe that history does not repeat itself?
D.B. Oreshkin: Well, it does repeat itself, obviously with some elements of farce. The common feature is that those who are not efficient in economy get the upper hand; however they are effective in bureaucratic games, hence they are interested in strengthening the bureaucracy, strengthening the administrative vertical, call it what you please, and in reducing the area of free competition where the winners are the more efficient, more competitive, more advanced people in this country. It seems to me that certainly we are witnessing deja-vu.
L.A. Ponomarev: Is that all? Then Mikhail Lvovich Berger, please.
M. L. Berger: Thank you very much, I am editor-in-chief of the ‘Yezhenedelny zhurnal” (“Weekly Magazine”). I’ll try very briefly to answer one simple but very important question – is there freedom of speech in the coverage of this particular case, the Yukos case. I believe that it is only fair to raise such a question because in my opinion when someone asks a question whether journalists and mass media can cover a certain subject freely and openly it means that we are witnessing a certain sovietization of our informational life. As my middle-aged and senior colleagues remember there always existed “lists of subjects” which could not be touched. Of the kind “Dear Leonid Ilyich”, or under Gorbachev there were certain themes which simply were untouchable. Now everybody knows perfectly well that there exists a list of subjects, certainly not as extensive as in the Soviet time, which journalists are free not to cover. This is exactly the situation and I am saying it quite consciously because the methods regulating the maintenance of this list are very refined and shrewd. There is no ban in the direct sense of the word. All of us are familiar with the NTV case and everybody understands that the government and authorities have enough tools to let journalists, publishers and broadcasters know that such a list really exists and one cannot break these rules. Everyone knows about the special attitude of the President to Chechnya and we see how this theme is covered, say, by government or government-affiliated mass media. There is a number of other sensitive zones where there is such a special spot. As for the Yukos case I would point out in this connection one interesting thing: in principle the public has an opportunity to know another point of view, different from the official one, which is already a welcome change from Soviet times, let alone the Stalin times, and this is a sign of progress. In principle one could say that all journalists can write and say whatever they want about this case, all publishers and all broadcasters can inform the people of anything they wish on this subject. However, for some reason they want different things and, say, heads of government television channels or government-affiliated mass media cover the Khodorkovsky case from a predetermined angle. I don’t think this needs deciphering – they sort of divide the same people into spies and special service agents, that kind of interpretation. And certainly government television presents Khodorkovsky to the viewers as a kind of spy while free commentators – those who wish to do so, certainly not all free commentators choose to support a different point of view – present him as a sort of special service agent, that is, a “good” guy who is “on our side”. I would also like to stress that fortunately we can in principle follow all the stages of this case, we are informed about them, there are no secret acts and this is some progress in itself in comparison with what happened in Soviet times, let alone much earlier times. But look at what is happening. I will allow myself to use such a word – a certain “Chechenisation” of the theme is taking place, in two senses: first, basically everybody knows that the President himself and the higher authorities are very sensitive to this subject, one has no right to a mistake in this connection because hot water or sewage could be shut off, and second, which is much more profound and important: “Chechenisation” consists in the public being tired of arguments different from the arguments of the authorities. In principle those commentators, journalists, TV journalists, whoever attempting to present an objective point of view (though there are not many of them, as Mr. I.M. Dzialoshinsky says), or those who try to present the situation as being free from any restrictions, from day to day, from month to month they have to repeat almost the same set of arguments of which everyone is sick and tired. In principle nowadays people do not get up in the morning thinking “what’s new in Chechnya?” Well, it’s just more of the same and we are not going to learn anything new. So we observe a certain fatigue in the coverage of this particular issue and people stop responding and this is not happenstance. Nowadays the authorities have enough patience to wait until indifference in connection with this problem reaches a certain degree, and from the point of view of the authorities which have no political competitors it is quite a rational approach. In this situation you have all the time in the world, no one is pressing you, there is an opportunity to shape a subtle and shrewd information policy. And when I say that in principle we can say what we want though everybody wants to say different things – and they actually do – there is a totally objective point of view and, on the other hand, there is an aggressive point of view with respect to the authorities, all these views are expressed but there is just one – technical – hitch. The thing is that the official point of view is expressed by mass media covering almost 100 % of the country. The other point of view is expressed by publications with very modest circulations and it is quite natural that for purely technical reasons the public opinion should adopt the point of view expressed by government channels. I’d like to say that there is one more important thing which perhaps has not been given consideration at the “headquarters” directing the handling of the Yukos case – that such slanted coverage in government-affiliated mass media is to my mind the most significant proof of the government’s interest in quite a definite coverage of this conflict. It is a perfectly clear proof – how the case is presented. The same events, the same meetings, the same conflict situations – how they are presented in official mass media and in those which are not bound by any particular restrictions. So, answering the question whether there is freedom of speech in the coverage of this conflict I can say: there exists a special “mode” of freedom of speech. Thank you.
L.M. Alexeeva: If there is a special “mode” of freedom of speech and all is done in such a careful way then from your point of view by what forces is this “mode” regulated, as everything else is done in this country, it cannot happen by itself, is there some mechanism?
M.L Berger: I have already spoken about technical facilities. For instance, the first and second channels would never cite an article from the Financial Times or from a number of reputable western publications like the NTV would do, let alone printed or on-line Internet mass media. On the surface it looks as if everything is according to the rules, there are no overt “deviations from Marxism ”, putting it bluntly, there are no violations of rules, laws etc. However, administrators of these mass media understand perfectly well what they must do and very thoroughly and efficiently carry out the task set to them. These are very simple, administrative means.
L.M. Alexeeva: If I got you right all this has built itself on the basis of our long Soviet experience with minimum guidance from above. Am I right?
M.L. Berger: Well, there is simple practice when heads of mass media are invited to the Kremlin for “a talk”. Yes, it’s a well-known story. They work separately with television people, with printed publications, sometimes with both. Well, “to talk”. As an administrator of a magazine I must say that it is difficult to refuse such an invitation because direct contact with the powers that be or with its authorised bureaucrats is a very useful thing. One can learn something that one cannot see on TV or read in newspapers. Well, as a rule at these informal meetings a certain mood is conveyed which exists in the Kremlin at this particular point on this or that issue. Then it’s up to heads of TV channels or newspapers to draw their conclusions, how to respond, the more so that having come to such a meeting they actually put their signature under – what do you call it – well, like in the first department – “I have been informed of the rules of conduct”. Of course one is free to break them but what if you have not paid for your apartment for half a year ? Or something else may happen to you.
S.A. Kovalev: This is quite an interesting dialogue, let’s continue it. Did I get your point of view right? There is no return to censorship, everybody understands it. No return, it is impossible to recreate Glavlit or Gulag. No one is strong enough to do it. But should it be done? Isn’t it enough to listen to the voice of inner censor to whom our journalists continue to turn? Let’s take as an example what happened to the press. There was this well-known NTV case. Note that it was a dispute of economic agents – it was a real gem from the technical point of view. It was a clear manifestation of the fact that executive power does not interfere in litigation. Courts are a separate branch of government. That’s why they don’t interfere. Well, the court took a decision that it thought appropriate. And we have a certain technical method, a model, and subsequently this lesson is learned. You said that mass media can inform their readers of anything they wish. They have complete freedom. However, they should remember certain examples. Well then, what are you talking about – that a new censorship model has been built, deliberately and with care? Am I right or not?
M.L. Berger: I would use the imperfect form of the verb – this censorship system is being built, it hasn’t been built, but there is no doubt about it, such a trend does exist. You have recalled the dispute of economic agents. I would like to stress in this connection that in reality there was no economic interest in the NTV case, no wish to return the debts, no economic meaning. And it can be proved in a very simple way, we see here our colleague Kiselev, he could tell us the whole story in greater detail. However, as far as I know when Kiselev’s team went over to TV6-TVC this company received quite a substantial loan from Vnesheconombank, from the government, i.e., from taxpayers, and at one time Lesin, head of the Ministry of the Press, demagogically persuaded us that they would preserve the company because the company is a major borrower and 40 million dollars must be returned. I am firmly convinced that this loan has been long forgotten, that it was written off long ago and no one is trying to return it in any way because this money was sacrificed for the solution of a task that has nothing to do with economic problems. And all these numerous examples show that the government indeed does not interfere in how its instruments of power address the tasks set before them. It does not matter if it is some ministry, the judiciary or some other bodies.
L.A. Ponomarev: Thank you. Alexander Alexandrovich Konovalov, please.
S.A. Kovalev: The judiciary is an instrument, too...
M.L. Berger. Some courts ... well, in principle one could say that.
А. A. Konovalov: Thank you, dear colleagues. Much has already been said, so that I have almost nothing to add, but what was very much pleasant to me, it is how the colleague began with putting the question which we debate now into the context. And the context is as follows ... Alexander Alexandrоvich Konovalov, President of the Strategic Estimations Institute. So, the context is as follows: in my opinion, there are some moments which we should take into account when discussing the Yukos case. Firstly, we live in a situation of a paradox - we have a President who is more and more democratic, more and more advanced and, on the other hand, there are more and more numerous manifestations of authoritarianism in actual life. For example, let's consider the last message of the President to the Federal Assembly: it is perhaps for the first time when the President's message begins with the statement that regarding society of free people, it depends only on us, whether we shall manage to build a free society of free people, and ends up with the words, that only a free man responsible for himself, his family and Motherland, is capable of solving the problems he encounters. That is, practically, a free businessman released from pressure of bureaucracy and state. It is the first element of the context containing great discrepancy. It is pregnant with some concealed fault which once will break out. Do you feel this? The President and his valetry cannot take opposite ways, or it should burst out somewhere and sometime. Secondly, when we speak about Yukos today, it seems that our discussion is a bit belated. The event already has taken place and even its aftereffects, though not all of them, have already taken place too. We should realise that people en mass are pleased that one nouveau riche has been detained. In the country with such a level of social inequality, when they imprison the man whose capital is appraised at $8 billion, it causes, well, though not a nationwide rejoicing, but certainly a satisfaction of the majority, not a sympathy for Khodorkovsky. And we should realise that these feelings partially aren't caused simply by the innate poverty of Russians, but by an understanding of the facts: а) that in the 1990s the privatisation was performed according to certain rules, which the majority of people did not acknowledge as fair, and which can never be fair, as it is a question of sawing the "state pie" into pieces. It was not Khodorkovsky who, using his creative faculties and God-given talents, had explored crude oil deposits, drilled the wells and built the company. At first it was necessary to receive something else. By the way, others acted very much like these people in Yukos. And here arises a very important question about social responsibility of business, which in our country is close to zero, or, in case of Khodorkovsky, just began to raise above a zero level. Such being the case, it is impossible to expect any ground-swell of popular support. The essence of the problem is not in that the "Open Society" Institute will be created, but that it is crystal-clear to everybody that such money cannot be coined within such time by anybody's own talents only. Thus, in the 1990s there were holes, numerous holes which allowed to evade taxes by means of offshores, but, then, the offshores were permitted. Others evaded taxes by means of the so-called “disabled” firms (i.e. firms employing disabled people and therefore granted some tax exemptions), as Sibneft did, selling most of crude oil to these "disabled" companies, which had very significant tax exemptions. It was lawful, but immoral. And people saw it. This discrepancy between law, ethics and morals irritated people very much, so many see what happens now as a certain fair punishment. Now we have another question, whether there are any political motives in Khodorkovsky's case. A little bit naive question to my mind. Surely, there are. Actually, all this has been set in motion by the political motives. And here we encounter another very interesting phenomenon, which exists even in conditions of a completely open information society. I say “completely”, since I mean not only our society, but others as well. Please note: the government officials, especially those of higher rank, are more and more deepening into some kind of virtual reality. They have no time to read newspapers, nor to watch TV, let alone to look out of the window. They meet with common people shaking hands through a row of bodyguards. So, what kind of information do they rely upon actually? Actually they rely upon some analytical reports received from FSB, or, may be, from security service, or from the Ministry of Defence. This results in the formation of a certain virtual reality in which the leader lives and which has nothing, or nearly nothing, in common with physical reality. In my opinion, they managed to frighten the President saying that Khodorkovsky allegedly is striving for presidency, wants to occupy his chair, which, in my opinion, is terribly naive and not funny. To expect that, even given our level of freedom, people now would elect a billionaire Jew as Russian President is extremely frivolous and unrealistic, but the authorities nevertheless were seriously scared of Khodorkovsky's actions in political sphere. Now, what consequences will it have for us? I'm not an economist, but I know for sure (and we have already mentioned this fact) that the uncollected profit will be $8 billion, and that the losses due to Russia's undercapitalisation have constituted $18 billion. Well, indeed, who in Russia is interested in share prices, who gambles on a stock exchange? Actually we were on the verge of the situation when the President could acquire a very powerful lever of influence on global economy through the coming of our largest oil companies to the largest world oil companies level. Why instead did he prefer to drop this lever and to exchange it for mythical political benefits, and even more mythical benefits of Yukos' rehashing, if only such thing will happen? There is one more question, that is, whether all this in general has been organized to shake the business up and to intimidate it, or is it an isolated case, because one large company should be shared between some parties? For the time being I have no ready answer to this question, because it is not clear yet who will inherit Yukos. I had a chance to comment on this theme in a radio program, and there were questions coming, like “So many billions have already been received, when will they start sharing them, and when may we expect to get our own share? Khodorkovsky is already in jail, and still nobody of us has received nothing”. Well, the answer to this question is the following: Revolutions always deprived of undeserved privileges those who had no rights to them and handed them over to those who had even less rights to them. No old women, no retirees will gain anything from Yukos' sawing down and redistribution. Who will be the winners - R. Abramovich, the so-called "St. Petersburg gang", or somebody else – this is an interesting thing to consider and to assess, because it will become clear then what all this fuss was aimed at. But, nevertheless, the political "costs" are in no case paid off by any conceivable economic preferences which someone will receive. The authorities should not be afraid of such kind of information, and the authorities should be guided, well, forgive my being an idealist, by interests of the state first of all. You know, someone can saw off $100 million from Yukos, but it was a question of tens of billions which the country could have received and thus could come up to an essentially new level, but now it will not, or will, but in the very distant future. This includes also the investment climate - that is, things which cannot be measured in meters or weighed in kilograms, though they are quite material things and due to which we will lose very severely. Here one should see the other side of the coin as well: the state has taken advantage of the fact that the business has very strongly "exposed" itself and, as I have already said, that the social responsibility of business in our country is zero. Therefore, one should not be surprised when usually kind and hearty Russian people suddenly begin jabbing out the landlords' horse's eyes - for we once have already lived through it.
L. A. Ponomarev: The floor is given to Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov. Boris Yefimovich, please introduce yourself, in what capacity you take part in our hearings.
B. Y. Nemtsov: My present positions are numerous. Since this is a public hearing, I shall tell that I'm a member of “Committee 2008” and member of the political council of SPS. I shall very briefly answer those questions, though not all of them, which were formulated by the organisers of the hearings. “Were there any political motives behind initiating criminal proceedings against Yukos' top managers?” Answer: 100 % there were. Last year I repeatedly talked with Khodorkovsky, including about problems of relations of his company and him personally with the authorities. Last April Khodorkovsky' met with President Putin. At that meeting Khodorkovsky was clearly told to cease financing the opposition parties. It was that summer that everything began. I can tell you as the SPS leader that indeed the company and its shareholders financed the democratic opposition, including SPS, Yabloko, and as far as I known, the left opposition as well. Naturally, the authorities deemed that similar actions did not fit the general concept of controlled democracy, and therefore decided to punish such an independent businessman. “Do you agree that the Yukos case was initiated in order to avert a creeping coup d'etat prepared by the accused or, on the contrary, it became a consequence of these events ?” By the way, Mr. Konovalov very accurately described it, that there is a set of employees who basically copy yesterday's newspapers as well as rumours about nightmares which occur inside and around the Kremlin, and the version about the transformation of the Russian Federation from presidential into a parliamentary republic has reached the higher authorities and, probably, these authorities were frightened very much. Further, the 5th question: “Is, in your opinion, the Yukos case a continuation of the anti-oligarch company of 2000?” Certainly, it is. The point is that for the authorities it is more convenient and beneficial to struggle against the hated oligarchs, because it is popular. And the war against both Gusinsky and Berezovsky, and against Khodorkovsky, and against anybody else, brings additional political dividends, though as regards both material standing of citizens and social justice the situation is only worsening. “What are the trends of the political situation development in the country, in your opinion, connected with the Yukos case development during expired year?” You know, here we see the authorities sending three - I consider it to be a very important moment - three signals to the people and the business. The first is - forget the law, the Kremlin justice is superior than the law. An absolutely iron, direct, and frontal signal. All the rest is Basmanny court, Tverskoi Court, they all are only consequences. The main slogan is “Forget the law, there are no laws, it is we who are the bosses. And it is our St. Petersburg justice that decides the country’s destiny”. The second signal which is sent to the country is: “Be loyal. Do not take into your head to have a position different from ours. Otherwise there will be problems”. Third, “Do not dare fund opposition, or we will twist your head off”. Three such simple theses, which pertain to ordinary citizens, which pertain to wealthy people, pertain to all. Actually, this is the main signal, which has been very well understood by the business community, you may believe me, I cannot tell that it is accepted by it with much delight, but yet it has been accepted. Next question: “How has the Yukos case affected the relations between various institutes of authority and business structures?” Dear friends, you may know that the market and business are organised very simply: if they are displeased with something, the money just disappears, and goes elsewhere. Well, for example, here is a Russian paradox - in the first quarter of this year our country demonstrated rather high rates of growth, which were more than 7 % of the GDP growth, then the downfall of the Russian companies shares began in April. The shares have dropped by almost 20 %, and I am talking about “blue chips”, not any third-category companies. It is 100-percents sure thing that this market collapse is connected with deep mistrust to authorities. When the authorities said that they were going to nationalise Yukos, or, putting it more exactly, started to move towards its bankruptcy, the market has fallen off immediately. Thus, if one could by a single word characterise mutual relations of authorities and business, this word would be: “a deep mistrust”. That's all. A deep mistrust - mutual and reciprocal. The authorities believe that people earning money are deeply immoral, and the business believes that the authorities that do not stand on the guard of the law have no right to be called the supreme power. Actually, all their mutual relations are confined to this maxim. Now I'd like to say one word, which is beyond the agenda of the these hearings. I think that Khodorkovsky has been jailed for political reasons, and thus he is a political prisoner. Tax evasion, "Apatit case", investment auctions - well, you know the saying: if there is a man, a relevant case may always be framed up, especially as far as regards business matters of the 1990s - no illusions here. But I'm convinced that if Mikhail Borisovich were more loyal, or simply loyal, I think that the today's hearings simply wouldn't happen. Thank you.
L. M. Alexeeva: Since he has answered all the questions, what else you have to ask?
S. A. Kovalev: Boris Yefimovich, my question will be about political opposition. In my opinion, there cannot be any normal political evolution of a country, if it is a democratic country, in which there is no political opposition, in which the power is monopolized. In this connection I would like to ask you a question. In that advance …. this is, so to say, opposition parties.
B. Y. Nemtsov: There is a number of, I'd say, questions vital for the country, on which we and the authorities have quite opposite points of view. I shall name these questions. Chechnya: they believe that Ramzan Kadyrov will introduce law and order there, while we consider that the political process is needed. The press: they believe that journalists with gag in the mouth should be sitting in this building, while we consider that there should be competition and really independent mass media not funded from state sources. Federalism: they believe that all money should be collected in Moscow and that supervisors should be put behind the governors, while we consider that it is necessary to defend the rights of regions. Local self-government: they believe that cities will survive on their own, for they just have nothing else to do, while we consider that local self-government is the basis of civil society. Relations with the CIS countries: They believe that it is necessary to direct all of them, while we consider that it is necessary to respect the sovereign right of each state to decide its own destiny. Parliamentarism: they believe that parliament is a division of their office under Surkov's management, while we consider it an independent branch of authorities which should control the Kremlin. Multi-party system: they believe that the country should have a single party, and any multi-party system is deemed by them to be a defect of their activity (so, the very existence of the opposition is just such a defect), while we consider that only in the multiparty country there is a chance to achieve everyone's success. You may see, there is practically no question on which we would agree with them, and there is it. It is not a matter of words “opposition - not opposition”, the main point is the essence of the question. We have different points of view on key basic problems, and our attitudes may also be expressed differently (one can hold indignation rallies or throw rotten eggs at Spassky tower, but the normal way is a parliamentary dialogue), and our basic values are, certainly, different. We are made of different dough, understand? They believe in bureaucracy and state capitalism, and we believe in a free democratic country and competition, and certainly in this sense we are opposition. Now, I am convinced, if this opposition was just a chucklesome clownery, Khodorkovsky would hardly be so pressed. Now, there is a left opposition also, and one can't just "wicker" it. I disagree that it is necessary to return into the Soviet Union, but, nevertheless, it exists, and certainly it is an opposition, it is a protest, even if it is a protest leading to nowhere, but a protest nevertheless, therefore I think that the left is an opposition too. Now they are living through hard times, but, nevertheless, it is an opposition, therefore I consider that there was an opposition in the country. As to what happens to it now, I think that the Kremlin has chosen a course towards one-party system. They want a one-party system, and as a matter of fact it already exists. Just look at the State Duma, where there are more than 300 deputies from the United Russia, i. е. the qualified parliamentary majority; just look at regional parliaments, at governors at last - they are either non-party or the United Russia members. This course they borrowed, by the way, as they affirm (I spoke with them), from the so-called democratic Japanese pattern. That is, there is LDPJ (Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan) out there, so they consider that we should repeat the Japanese way, crafty neglecting the fact, that Japan is parliamentary country, and that it has no head of state of such kind, which we have, i.e. with huge authorities, therefore they are attempting to build a one-party country of the obsolete Soviet type, we can not agree with it in any way, because it is sure an impasse.
L. A. Ponomarev: Thank you very much. Now - Alexey Petrovich Kandaurov. Please.
А. P. Kandaurov: I'm a State Duma deputy, but here I act more as a private person, since before being elected into the State Duma I for 10 years had been working together with Khodorkovsky in different structures, and therefore I am concerned about his fate, as well as about destinies of Lebedev and Pichugin. I categorically object, that they should be kept behind bars. It is bad for them, for their kinsfolk and relations, it is bad for society. Is this a political process or not? Certainly, it is. That Khodorkovsky and Lebedev (well, I would rather speak more about Khodorkovsky, because Lebedev is just a victim who, together with Pichugin, so to say, suddenly found himself in the middle of hot soup, because of Khodorkovsky, because of his position), that they are charged under criminal clauses, it means nothing - the new Criminal Code does not contain Articles 70, 190.1 and 58/10. To bring them to justice for espionage would be completely equal to challenging the entire judiciary (and investigative) system. That some suitable clauses were found, that shouldn't deceive anybody. I think, that at least in the end of 2002 the authorities had yet no intention to imprison Khodorkovsky. I think - well, I actually even possessed relevant information - that at that time there was no strain neither in the Kremlin nor in other structures which then were conducting this policy. During the period from the beginning of 2003 to the moment of his arrest Khodorkovsky had committed several mistakes, well, here I place this word - mistakes - in inverted commas for, naturally, they were mistakes from the point of view of the authorities. It is quite probable that he already began committing mistakes when he started making his business transparent, that is, attempted to change the system of co-ordinates in which we today exist, the economic co-ordinates system. In 2003 he became … he attempted to clear up the political preferences, he told that he was funding someone - here he too has committed a mistake, i. е. He attempted to make transparent this system too. But you and me understand that the oligarchic system, as it is called, cannot exist in a transparent space, which is X-rayed from different directions. Therefore, having tried to jump out of this oligarchic net of society, he has set the authority structures in turmoil, as well as those society circles which were not ready for this transparency. Neither the authorities were ready, nor the certain part of business community, and that was his first mistake. The second mistake is that having built the successful company, having learned how to earn money, he attempted to take a more active social position, public position, that is to spend a part of the money for improving the civil society, for charity, etc., etc. And he has taken several actual steps, that is he created the “Open Russia”, Internet education system - well, it is a too long list to announce it here, and all its items are completely concrete charity projects; unfortunately, they too did not fit the visions of authorities about how an obedient oligarch should behave, though as regards Khodorkovsky, this label cannot be affixed to him, it simply has nothing to do with him. It was his second mistake. The third mistake is the merger with Sibneft. The authorities too were not ready, or just did nor want the company to become such a great power, which for clear reasons would become already a subject of the international economic life and even more independent from the authorities than before. And a small fourth mistake is a memorable Putin's meeting with the RSPP (Russian Association of Manufacturers and Entrepreneurs) representatives, when Khodorkovsky publicly declared that it is necessary to do away with corruption and as an example presented the story of the state-run company Rosneft’s public sawing down, which company has bought the Severnaya Neft Co without, as Khodorkovsky considered, serious international evaluation. I shall remind here that the bargain then equaled $600 million. Khodorkovsky said that the outside price of Severnaya Neft was $300 million and the President, certainly, was unable to forget that public humiliation … it is difficult to imagine. Further on the events began to develop with gathering force. I want to remind you of the chronology, to clarify things, because now we have proceedings underway. I give the information which I know, which was in my possession. Because this attack against Apatite (now I won’t say who was behind it for … it is not so important) began in the end of 2002, and the authorities did not yet took a direct part in it - the participants were the business community together with some governors. And the prosecutor's office studied the question. In the end of March the Prosecutor General submitted a report to Kasyanov that there were no claims rgarding Apatit any more. Moreover, an amicable agreement was signed in 2002, in which the RFFI's independent estimation was conducted and the money was paid - this was in the end of March. And already in the beginning of June the criminal proceedings were instituted on the basis of the very same episodes, and Lebedev, with all relevant elements of intimidation, and then Khodorkovsky were arrested. Therefore, for me there are no questions from the point of view of what the incentive, or the driving motives were; the sole question for me is how the authorities will elbow its way out of this situation. I think, that they are not going to get out of this situation, especially if they will not be assisted by the public opinion and such events as the today's hearings. I think that any judgement in Khodorkovsky's case will be political, except for one - except for the decision that he and Lebedev will be at all points acquitted. As for Pichugin, I can only tell, that - look! - a ridiculous situation (I'm in a certain way professional and I do understand something in these questions), when Pichugin is accused of being an assassination organiser in the absence of corpses and performers. Will you tell me how it is possible ? Who has pointed at him as the assassination organiser? Therefore, I could item-by-item assort all the ridiculous moments in Khodorkovsky's, Lebedev's, Pichugin's charges, but I think, that it will take a lot of time, and this does not constitute the subject of today's discussion. Thank you.
L. A. Ponomarev: Thank you. Andrei Andreevich asked us … he is in a hurry, therefore we will not be asking you questions now. Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, please.
А. A. Piontkovsky: Thank you very much. Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, Center of Strategic Studies. I find myself in a rather inconvenient position, because dear Alexei Pertovich has just delivered, in my opinion, the central thesis (on which I, properly speaking, was going to dwell), that the basic guilt of Khodorkovsky before bureaucracy and authorities consists even not in that he dared to fund the opposition parties, but in that he wanted to fundamentally change the rules of the game in the Russian economy. Well, I shall allow myself to slightly elaborate on this point, because prior to Alexei Pertovich nobody had spoken about it, and therefore I will return to that scene which had been just spoken about, that is the famous dialogue between the oligarch and the President in February last year at the President's meeting with the RSPP leaders – Khodorkovsky said: “Mister President, your bureaucrats are bribe-takers and thieves”, and presented a completely convincing example. The President has come in an extreme irritation and answered: “Mister Khodorkovsky, do you want me to remind you how you became the holder of your company?”. And he also was right in his own way, because all those things which the colleague Konovalov told about are completely correct. We are well aware how the capitals of ours oligarchs, including Khodorkovsky, were created. Surely, it was a certain deal with authorities, in other words, these people were simply assigned by the authorities and multiplied their capitals at the expense of enormous use of the administrative resource, and so did all our big business in the 1990s. But the President did not understand the essence of the Khodorkovsky's message, or consciously did not want to show that he understood it. Because Khodorkovsky, in essence, said the following: “Mister President, during 10 years all of us have been jointly creating the oligarchy capitalism system, or system of merger of money with authorities, which system is absolutely inefficient and unpromising from the point of view of development of our country. This system means marginalisation of Russia and condemns it to the fate of a third world countries. We should change it, and I attempt to do this, not only by my declaration, but by what I had been doing during the last 2-3 years, having made my company transparent, having changed corporate management according to western standards, participating in large social projects, but I cannot do everything alone, your bureaucracy also has to change”. That, actually, was Khodorkovsky’s appeal, and the President, as bearer of the state interests, whatever his personal irritation in this case could be, certainly should have supported him, but in this case he simply acted as the chief of bureaucratic corporation, because what Khodorkovsky offered and demanded threatened all the system of bureaucratic authorities. Who is an oligarch, properly speaking? His is not just a rich man, an oligarch is a "binary relation", that is, a relation of business and authorities, a system, when all business is in shadow and exists due to connections with bureaucracy, due to administrative resource and therefore "swallows its hook", that is, from the point of view of bureaucracy Khodorkovsky committed the most terrible crime - he wanted to get free from the power of this bureaucracy, to change the pattern of capitalist development of Russia. This reaction of the President triggered off a lot of events much more serious than just the arrest of Khodorkovsky and his colleagues. I understand, that it is a personal tragedy, but much more damage to the country was done because at this crossroad, at this possibility of choice the bureaucracy has won, the bureaucratic capitalism has won. The prosecution of Khodorkovsky is presented by the authorities as a struggle against oligarchy, but Khodorkovsky was the man who wanted to struggle against oligarchy, and the reaction of the authorities and bureaucracy just fixes this system. Instead former oligarchs of Yeltsin's generation others are placed, those who are personally loyal to Putin and his team and first of all - the collective oligarch of Russian bureaucracy and its armed squad - the "power structures". (i.e. police & army)
L. M. Alexeeva: I very much approve and understand what you have said about, first of all, the protection of corporate authorities of bureaucracy, protection of corporate interests of the bureaucracy. I understand that the answer to this question is, maybe, easy to guess, and everyone of us could guess it, but still, what is your opinion, does the President realize that he is, if not a hostage, then a defence attorney of the bureaucracy interests, or maybe he has some visions of his own which coincide with the interests of bureaucracy in this case?
А. A. Piontkovsky: Well, I think that everything the President did since this historical meeting shows that he, in general, feels his historical function, first of all, in being the carrier and spokesman of interests of this corporate bureaucracy and the defender of these interests. Quite another matter is that in doing so he can deceive himself as much as necessary by the declaration that the interests of this bureaucracy coincide with historical interests of the country, to reason about sovereignty and statehood, but objectively we see manifestations of predatory interests of bureaucracy encouraged by the President. Let's consider the "second advent” of minister Reiman into the government, which happened before our very eyes. All know perfectly well that if minister Reiman is busy with something in the government, it is the destiny of his own "candle-making factory" - that is Megafon company (and, by the way, nobody tries to conceal or deny the fact that Mr. Reiman is a figure personally close to Putin). Or let's consider another figure, whose name was already mentioned here. Mr. Lesin – true, he is not a minister but a big governmental official and all know, what kind of a "candle-making factory" he owns - it is Video International. So, in my opinion, the answer to your question is quite obvious, and I do formulate it not just as an intuitive guess, but as a medical fact.
S. A. Kovalev: Well, I wanted to ask the same question. So do you indeed believe that the main interest of the top of authorities, main interest of that top's symbol, of the first person of the state, consists in the protection of bureaucracy, and he does not have any other interests? So, it is his main interest - to protect business, the illegal business of Lesin, the shadow business of Lesin, or are there some other interests?
А. A. Piontkovsky: If you will ask Mr. Putin about it he will absolutely sincerely answer you that his interest is the greatness of Russia and construction of Russia as a powerful state economically equal to the "Great Eight" but the pattern he selected for this purpose, the so-called authoritarian modernisation and bureaucratic capitalism, objectively forms the chain of his everyday decisions … actually it serves for attaining a much more ordinary purpose, whether he understands that or not.
S. A. Kovalev: In the other words, you believe that the construction of controlled democracy, construction of the centralised state, where boundaries of independence are specified for everyone - it is the very subordination of the state tasks to the bureaucracy interests, did I understand you correctly ?
А. A. Piontkovsky: Yes.
L. A. Ponomarev: Now we shall give floor to the expert who sitting at this side. Boris Borisovich Nadezhdin, please.
B. B. Nadezhdin: To tell the truth, with so much already having been said here, it is so difficult to add something. I have the same problem as Mr. Nemtsov, that is, in what capacity to introduce myself. I'm a Holder of the Law Chair in the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology - this is as per my main workplace nowadays. I shall add only two nuances to what was already told. The first one is that in 2003 I was a State Duma deputy. It is such a small stroke that I add to the whole canvas about Khodorkovsky's conspiracy to transform the country into a parliamentary republic, control Duma, etc. And suddenly, completely unexpectedly, in March - April, a large group of journalists started visiting me. So, within one week I was visited by many different journalists (this is concerning Berger's presentation - probably, there was some counsel in the Kremlin then), who were asking me: “What do you know about the Khodorkovsky's bringing parliament deputies under his control?”. I knew perfectly nothing, though I was in the centre of Duma's life, being a member of Duma Council, but I did not feel any conspiracy at all, so they said: “But the facts are that they buy entire fractions of deputies”, and I thought: “Strange story - but miracles do not exist’. It was approximately in March - April. Obviously, there was some command "to tell the truth to people", that is, it was absolutely clear that it was a kind of planned operation - to prepare public opinion, etc. And the second nuance which also was important. The point is that in October the situation evolved rather quickly - arrest of Khodorkovsky, dismissal of Voloshin, and all other developments. Actually, the two principal groups of influence in the Kremlin were, so to say, balancing, they had different positions regarding Khodorkovsky’s case, but I approximately understand that was the decisive moment, when the decision on the necessity of the arrest was taken. The matter is in the following. Yukos has created in the previous Duma quite a powerful system of influence - this is pure truth. Mention should be made that this influence was far from being such a primitive lobbyism, that is, for instance, the tax laws profitable for business in general were really written by the Yukos people in the Duma - this is perfectly known by everybody (first of all by Dubov et. al., and without them there simply would be no tax reform at all), but there was one nuance there, which, probably, has filled the cup of patience of the liberal part of the Kremlin (Surkov et. al.) - it is when contrary to the agreement with the government the oil people led by Yukos essentially lowered the severance tax rate, it has taken place literally in the Duma session hall, and the government was very much impressed, how the Communist fraction, which was blaming the oligarchs publicly, voted in favor of the draft. And I think that these events have resulted in that such a liberal part of the Kremlin has also understood that the businesses start looking ugly. Just my two small strokes to be added to the entire grand canvas. Well, I can tell one more thing. In this case huge importance for such a development of events (including Khodorkovsky's arrest, which, I can say it as a lawyer, is an unprecedented case for such type of the charges presented - for there are no formal grounds in the Russian Criminal Procedure Code for an arrest for almost one year), there is one thing more, and it is the personal character of Khodorkovsky and the Yukos team. The point is in that they had many opportunities to compromise, but they (I'm slightly aware of events and discussions), they have taken an absolutely uncompromising position - that is, to stick out and do not surrender - and even somehow, if it is possible say so, have provoked the authorities to take violent measures concerning restraint of liberty, etc.: like that "we shall stick out and do with us what you want, we shall look what will come out". It is necessary to admit that it caused such a great surprise among those who observe similar events, because there was not yet such things in Russia. Usually after the first, well, maximum after the second or third warning the most serious and large companies made some arrangements to negotiate, and the incident was over, but here people acted from principle. Well, I'd like to tell one thing more (it seems, here in this hall I did not yet hear anybody to tell it). It is absolutely obvious, that the theme of struggle against oligarchs and theme of Khodorkovsky was the main theme of the Duma elections campaign in 2003, and the results of the Duma campaign, i.e. failure of the right parties to get into the parliament, the stunning success of the Rodina (which already had time to break down, but then it was yet existing) and United Russia blocks - all this was specially organised, simply, the central theme of the Duma elections was the struggle against oligarchs, which were presented to people in their full disguise of horror (blood-suckers, etc, etc.). Therefore, this plot was excellently used by the authorities (absolutely excellently, I repeat), for it has received a bulk of a short-term pluses from this situation, but the consequences, about which it has been already spoken here, for development of the country, for its image, for the development, in the final reckoning, of economy, of normal relations, this consequences are, certainly, catastrophic, and I think, that they will have a long-term aftereffect.
L. M. Alexeeva: You just said that you had an impression that the question about Khodorkovsky's arrest was finally decided when the so-called liberals in the Kremlin also became angry with him. It means that in the beginning they did not want to arrest Khodorkovsky. Then who, what group close to the President, was procuring the arrest?
B. B. Nadezhdin: Well, this things are generally known, that is, the President's administration, and certain persons in the President's administration, being in charge of these or other themes. After the Yeltsin - Putin exchange the latter inherited the administration, which was headed by Voloshin and included a number of former and present FSB officers, etc. Voloshin himself for a long time acted as a "constraining factor" as regards violent measures in the relation to Khodorkovsky (it is absolutely obvious), and Surkov to some extent also, they both had a historical connection with it ... Ivanov, Sechin - these state security people. Everything is clear, in my opinion.
L. M. Alexeeva: Is it because they are state security people, or because their expectations were more justified, than that of the ordinary citizens, who were asking, when they will be given a slice of Yukos ?
B. B. Nadezhdin: No. It doesn't matter that they are state security people. It is another thing which matters. They represent rather integrated system of views about what Russia is, about is composition, its future. I spent many hours talking with the majority of the people from this administration in due time for the different reasons. And may to assure you, that they keep in their heads a completely integral vision of the world, so much integral and clear: that is, there are enemies of the Rodina block, there is such a global "behind-the-scene". All this is set forth quite seriously, is premeditated, and some laws and decrees are written proceeding from this. It is so.
S. A. Kovalev: Boris Borisovich, what is your point of view concerning parliamentary prospect in Russia and new rearrangement of political forces?
B. B. Nadezhdin: Well, now an extensive discussion concerning the electoral system is going on (a large session will be held literally in the same place the day after tomorrow). I shall tell you: when one politician in the country, the President in this case, has an 80-% rating, and all the rest have less than 10% each, the specific forms are not so important. With any electoral system there will be a parliament in which 2/3 of people will follow the directions of Administration - the life is arranged so. In the end it is not a problem of the electoral system and not the form of management in the country (the forms, i.e. parliamentary republic, electoral system, are not so important, as the political regime – you understand). Our constitution is more liberal than the French one, for example, but in France it nevertheless happens, from time to time, that the President and the Chairman of the Government belong to different parties. Therefore, the question here is not in the form, but in a political regime. The political regime here in our country, unfortunately, is such that the majority of the country's population is ready to accept a kind of a good Tsar, who will be responsible for everything, and we for nothing. It results in such a single-party parliament, and the absence of real political competition as well. I can speak for a long time, I have an explicit answer to the question why is it so and what is to be done, but probably it is beyond the mainframe of the present event.
L.A. Ponomarev: Evgeny Alexeevich Kiselev.
Evgeny Alexeevich Kiselev: After all that has already been said, it seems that I have little to add, as I will inevitably repeat other speakers . Nevertheless, since I have been invited to this meeting, I would like to emphasise some things that are matters of principle for me. Even if it is for the 10th time (no matter how often it has been mentioned today), it is very important to repeat that I have not the slightest doubt that Khodorkovsky’s case is a political case, as has been several times stressed today, and absolutely rightly so. Andrei Piontkovsky probably formulated this more precisely than anyone else. The case is political because Khodorkovsky tried, for one or another reason, to change the rules of the game in politics, economics and Russian business. The organisers of these hearings formulated, among numerous questions offered for discussion, two interrelated questions. First question. The Russian President once said about the inadmissibility of big business’ involvement in politics. Do you think that big business is not a part of civil society and hence cannot affect politics? And the second question: Isn’t corruption as a phenomenon connected with the fact that there is no legal institutionalised involvement of big business in politics in the form of political parties, open financing of political public organisations, mass media, creation of a civilised lobbyism system? Yes, yes, yes. That is, I’m ready to answer all these questions in the affirmative. Big business is certainly a part of civil society, all the more so that it is very difficult to establish the boundary; we conditionally divide business into big, medium-sized and small, however, it is difficult to define where a medium-sized businessman becomes a big one or a small businessman becomes medium-sized. Naturally, there is certain ranking in terms of taxation, in terms of money turnover volumes. But we are not speaking about economics, we are now speaking of politics. The case in point is that big business, probably, should not get involved in politics according to the rules that existed in the early and mid-1990s, when the first super-big Russian businessmen emerged, who, given their tremendous possibilities, connections, influence, were in a position to quite often and effectively change if not prime ministers, then cabinet ministers. However, big business must surely affect politics, form a part of civil society through its involvement in party life, through open funding of political and public organisations, through mass media, through establishing a system of civilised lobbyism. Khodorkovsky positively sought, to a greater or less extent, to achieve all that, that is, some issues of that program were more important and near to him, others less important: if we take, say, mass media, for a long time quite consciously (I know it because we once discussed it with him), he quite consciously evaded involvement in any media projects, primarily those connected with television, because he believed that his participation in television business projects might mean too high risks for his business. I would like to draw your attention to another thing. It may have been mentioned or not mentioned today (I have not heard it). You know, there are western public political organizations, human rights activists and lawyers who in a varying degree along various lines are involved in at least monitoring the proceedings in Khodorkovsky’s case. For instance, the former Minister of Justice of Germany (I’m afraid I will not be able to pronounce her name; she was appointed PACE’s special rapporteur on Khodorkovsky’s case), there are lawyers, human rights supporters. They all stress one very simple thing: for us, for people living within the civil law-governed state co-ordinate system, the one and only thing is enough: if we see that the law is applied in this particular case on a surely selective basis, this only fact is enough for us, we need no other evidence that the case is a political one. That is, we all are well aware that the Russian capitalism had been built according to certain rules that had been formulated, in the first place, by people in charge of economic reforms in the country. Those rules were created at Yeltsin’s time. Yes, surely, both Khodorkovsky and other large businessmen whose fortunes were formed in the early 1990s prior to all privatisation auctions, they all were able to a varying degree to influence that process, the process of writing those rules. But we should not forget that the Kremlin people were not born yesterday either: Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Soskovets, Chubais, Gaidar, etc. As a result, a certain system of the rules of the game has been created that governed the privatisation auctions procedure, under which the Russian economy had been built prior to the 1998 default. And now, we see that the law enforcement authorities have pulled out of this context just one case and launched the prosecution of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, other Yukos shareholders, prosecution of a poor Pichugin who is charged with the organisation of a murder, though the very fact of the murder has not been established (it is an absolutely absurd case with no body and no perpetrator). Well, for any person living within a normal co-ordinate system of legal consciousness this is an absolute absurdity and convincing evidence that the case is political. Let me emphasise another thing. You know, I am amazed at the extent to which our society – partly journalists, partly public figures, partly intellectuals, partly representatives of political and social community – are affected by sclerosis. By the way, I do not want to peg at my colleagues journalists, as I feel that most people writing in newspapers or speaking on radio or TV (even if they are not allowed to tell the whole truth or voice this or that view on Khodorkovsky’s case) – in general, I see that the sympathies of these people are with Khodorkovsky, with Yukos, however, the feeling … sometimes I am amazed by the seriousness with which these or those charges brought against Khodorkovsky and his partners are discussed in the press and outside the media space (i.e., in political lobby, at political meetings, “tusovkas” as they are called now). You know, I would think it to be a bad joke, but I witnessed a well-known high-ranking government official (I would not disclose his name) below his breath explaining in my presence to his interlocutor that in reality Khodorkovsky had visited America in order to enlist Americans’ support for his taking power after 2008 and that he had allegedly met with Condoleezza Rice and the latter promised him support if after his coming to power Khodorkovsky ensured Russia’s unilateral nuclear disarmament. You know, I did not know how to react, as all this was said absolutely seriously. Later, I happened to hear from a number of journalists and politicians I know: “Yes, it’s true, it is disseminated quite deliberately, it is disseminated throughout political elite, political “tusovka”. I don’t know whether Boris Borisovich has heard it. He has. Great. You know, in fact, the most appalling thing is that all this was said in real earnest, and this is an evidence of the primeval level of thinking of our political establishment (at least some part of it). Those people do not understand at all what world we are living in, if they believe in that. The bipolar world has long ceased to exist, the opposition of the two nuclear powers does not any longer determine the essence of the processes taking place on the planet, our relations with the US have long been built, at least, on their part, on the basis of other principles, values and stratagems. And nevertheless, sometimes articles, even those written from the positions (you feel that the author writes the article, analyzes the latest charges brought against Yukos shareholders by prosecution and at the same time is feeling some sympathy): it can be read between the lines, you know. And this problem is at length and in earnest discussed in the newspaper space. You know, they could as well discuss whether Iosiph Brodsky was a loafer or whether Marshall Zhukov was preparing a military coup in 1957 in order to remove the high-ranking members of the Central Committee of the CPSU or whether Natan Scharansky was an American spy. Note that in their time the authorities, I deliberately do not draw a parallel with Stalin’s trials, it was too long ago and they took place in a quite another political epoch. Imagine that, after all, Stalin’s trials of the 1930s took place 20 years after the revolution (i.e., in point of fact they took place at the same historical epoch), like we are today separated from perestroika years by the same process; in a sense it was the continuation of the struggle that took place at that time. I deliberately try to make it closer to our days, all that happened within our memory. I remember how they convinced us from the newspaper pages with the same degree of persuasiveness, using the same system of evidence, that Natan Scharansky had been hooked by American intelligence and sent over to the west some information that was a state secret. Likewise, we were told that Zhukov had aspired to be a Russian Napoleon and prepared to oust from the armed forces the system of the party and political bodies with all that it implies. In our quite recent past we can find a number of examples when we were told that everything was absolutely lawful and right, and, regrettably enough, all that information turned out to be true. I am absolutely sure that some time later (I am not ready to make any forecasts about the outcome of Khodorkovsky’s case, he may be sentenced to a long-term imprisonment, he may be incarcerated or the sentence may be suspended – it is useless to make guesses. In this case the authorities in principle can do as they please, because public opinion is on their side. Generally, the most striking example illustrating the state of our public opinion today is the result of the recent poll by VTsIOM. The question was: “Who, in your opinion, could become a figure uniting the democratic forces in the country?”. An absolute leader (Nemtsov was the second with 7 %), was Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (23 %). An absolute majority of respondents said that Putin was the best figure to unite SPS, Yabloko and other small opposition groups siding with them. Anton Orekh, a presenter at “Ekho Moskvy” radio, made the following zinger: “How come we failed to hit upon the idea earlier? Now it is clear who must lead the Russian national football team at the next world championship – naturally, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He will lead us to victory in football, too”. Therefore, under the circumstances, the outcome of the trial is, most likely, predetermined, as the public opinion, alas... Even the fact that these hearings are held today, we can meet ten more times; I am not to say that this should not be done, but we, people who are trying to express another opinion, unfortunately, are in the minority. This opinion will not be broadcast on TV. I understand that only foreign TV companies are present here. NTV is here? You don't say so! It is really surprising, but it is not a fact that this will be included in the news reports this evening. Such things happen, you know it very well. Presumption of innocence, I agree. However, I am absolutely sure that some years will pass and the first thing that will be done will be a decision of European court instances, as I have no doubts that the team of Khodorkovsky’s defense counsels (one of them, Karina Moskalenko, is present here) will bring the case to the European Court and the outcome will be the same as in Gusinsky’s case, or, maybe, even more distinct. Some more time will elapse and the history will clear things up, everyone will get one’s due, therefore, in this respect I don’t worry at all. Thank you.
L.A. Ponomarev: Thank you. The last expert is Alexander Petrovich Tkachenko. Then all other experts can add something if they wish, and the commission members may ask questions.
A.L. Tkachenko: Alexander Petrovich Tkachenko, a writer, director of the Russian Pen Center. I would like to dwell on my personal feelings, as I often hear a question: “What do writers think about it?”. It is difficult to give an unambiguous answer, as there are 10,000 writers in this country. And, naturally, for members of the Writers’ Union in Komsomolsky Prospekt who mostly do not hold democratic views, it is a great joy; and you understand perfectly well the feelings of the writers who adhere to democratic values. I would like to review it from the point of view of what I myself am doing. First of all, I absolutely agree (excuse me for being late) with the previous speaker, Evgeny Alexeevich Kiselev, that this case is a political one. I would not delve deeply into the matter, I can simply draw your attention to the multivalency of the case, using a simple language of chemistry, how many roots it is striking in society practically disintegrating it. Just look how many other cases known here have quite a black course against the background of Khodorkovsky’s case, and sometimes even reverse movement is observed. For instance, Danilov’s case who was acquitted, but now the case is reopened; Sutyagin, who, in my opinion, was absolutely wrongfully sentenced to 15 years in prison. Other, less prominent cases: the case against the Sakharov Center, the Star Chamber trying the Russian language – I mean the case of Bayan Shiryanov, and many others. If we have a deeper and wider look, we will see the proceedings initiated, so to say, in the wake of Khodorkovsky’s case. I would like to say that when our society started perestroika 20 years ago, in the first place it wanted to do away with double standards. Now, and for quite some time (at least for five years) we have returned to that double standards model. Look, the President’s message says about free individuals and free society. What is Khodorkovsky? He is a strong man, strong personality, a gifted person, but it appears that the society does not need such persons. The society needs weak, frightened, easy to manage people. The thing that fills me with indignation rather than alarms or even scares me, is that in the recent years we have been witnessing a whole algorithm of such events. It all began with the disavowal of NTV headed by Kiselev followed by Channel 6, then two oligarchs were driven out from the country, and now the third one, the strongest, who tried to change the system of values inside the country has been jailed. So, it appears that society does not need such people, and this can be traced in everything. I believe that the president’s administration which has completely replaced the government in Russia is in such a way strengthening its power, and this will last for some more years, until Mr. President deigns either to stay or to go. However, now, using such trials which are browbeating the society, they are doing only one thing – they are strengthening their power. Actually, there is nothing positive in what is going on, how it is explained to the people, people who, in general, have also received a bone to chew over for a long time: so, they have begun to bump off oligarchs at last and we will finally get the part of the loot so much talked about. Naturally, we all understand that nobody will get nothing, and if they do, it will be those who will change the vector in this direction. In my opinion, the situation with Khodorkovsky had a very negative impact on out business, on our foreign policy, on our culture, because the moneys invested by Khodorkovsky alone in culture, those figures are incomparable with any governmental trifling injections. And now every ordinary businessman will think: “Is it worth doing anything at all, should I develop my company, advance my capital inside the country or somewhere else, if they will take it all away as soon as I reach a certain level in my area of business, they will inevitably find some mistake in order to take my business away from me and return it to the public treasury”. Using the chess language, the state starts the game and, unfortunately, wins. We have forgotten that at the beginning of perestroika the state declared that the main thing was the man. Now they have turned their back to the man and our state has become the most ominous oligarch one can think up, since it has all the cards in its hands, takes people for blockheads and generally behaves like a street swindler (you know that game where no one knows under what cap the little ball is). Therefore, in my concluding sentence I would like to say that fomenting fear and strengthening pseudo-patriotic sentiments with the help of such trials of people who are rather strong personalities – this is the main political objective, or you may use some other beautiful epithets. This, in brief, is my opinion.
L.A. Ponomarev: Thank you. The commission members have no questions to Alexander Petrovich now. I would like to ask the experts, those who had the endurance to stay until the end. Maybe you, gentlemen, would like to say something? You have heard the opinions of your colleagues. Is there any point you would like to discuss? No? Then let me conclude the hearings. At the beginning I forgot to mention that all those present today have attended the first public hearings in the post-Soviet Russia. I think that they were a success. We are grateful to all the experts who took part in our hearings. The hearings will continue. The materials of the first hearings will be published. I am sure that we have received very important evidence provided by professionals in various areas of politics, society, and this evidence will be helpful both for the lawyers and human rights activists in their strong intention to secure the release of prisoners Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Pichugin and seek open and fair trial within the law. Thank you.
L. М. Alexeeva: … but also the impact this trial has on society, we must whenever possible oppose the negative trends generated by this case.
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